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That airpower played a crucial role during Operation Desert Storm cannot be disputed. In fact, many, like the reporter quoted above, believe air power was the linchpin to success during Operation Desert Storm. It will be an age-old debate whether airpower alone could have won the war; however, such a debate is beyond the scope of this paper. Much of our success in Operation Desert Storm lies in the way General Norman Schwarzkopf, General Chuck Horner, Lieutenant General Buster Glosson, and countless others executed the war campaign plan--a plan based, in part, on Colonel John Warden's Instant Thunder plan.
1 The purpose of this paper is to briefly examine a portion of the air theory that formed the basis of Instant Thunder--Warden's five-ring system theory. Specifically, I will examine the legal and moral issues surrounding the use of Warden's five ring system theory and ultimately conclude his theory sidesteps major issues;
namely it fails to account for the legal and moral constraints of wartime targeting and, in doing so, increases the warfighter's potential to run afoul of international law, domestic law, and norms of expected behavior. 
Warden's Five Ring System Theory
Countries are inverted pyramids that rest precariously on their strategic innards--their leadership, communications, key production, infrastructure, and population. If a country is paralyzed strategically, it is defeated and cannot sustain its fielded forces though they be fully intact.
-Colonel John Warden Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century
The historical underpinnings of Warden's five-ring theory can essentially be traced to Carl von Clausewitz's magnum opus on war--On War. In On War, von Clausewitz notes that to effectively defeat an enemy a state should direct all of its energies against those points upon which everything for the enemy depends--center(s) of gravity or the -hub of all power and movement." 2 Warden took this principle a step further and developed a concept designed to guide wartime target selection.
3 He views the enemy as a system organized in the concentric rings--each ring representing an enemy's center of gravity that if properly attacked would make war prohibitively expensive for the enemy or eliminate the enemy's ability, temporarily or permanently, to wage war.
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Descending in order of importance from the innermost to the outer most ring is: (1) a leadership ring that controls the system or state, i.e., the state's leaders; (2) a system essential ring that provides or represents key production that is critical for state survival, i.e., oil, electricity, food and money; (3) an infrastructure ring that -ties the entire system together," i.e., transportation; (4) a population ring composed of the state's civilian population; and (5) a fielded forces ring or fighting mechanism ring that defends the state from attack. 
A. Wartime Targeting of Military Leaders
Military leaders, like the troops they command, are by definition combatants. 
B. Wartime Targeting of Civilian Leaders
It becomes much more difficult to determine the legality and morality of the wartime it becomes readily apparent that the legality of the wartime targeting of civilian leaders hinges on whether the civilian leaders are protected, internationally or domestically, from wartime attack.
Potential International Legal Sources of Protection
Three potential sources of international protection for civilian leaders during wartime readily come to mind--the 1949 Geneva Convention IV, the 1977 Geneva Protocol I, and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.
a. The 1949 Geneva Convention IV (Geneva IV)
Geneva IV, which the United States ratified on 2 August 1955, prohibits, among other things, the killing and summary execution of persons taking no active part in the hostilities. 26 It thus protects, from wartime attack, those civilian leaders who are not involved in the prosecution of the war; their killings, since they are protected internationally, could appropriately be viewed as assassinations. Moreover, not only would it be illegal to kill such leaders, it would also be morally reprehensible. Civilian leaders not involved in prosecuting the war are, in the truest sense of the phrase, -innocent of any wrongdoing with respect to the war" and the killing of the -innocent" has generally been viewed as immoral. 27 Those not involved in prosecuting the war are innocent or harmless in that they have not engaged in any wartime activity that would warrant their attack. Moreover, in defining the term innocent, and thus determining the morality of wartime targeting, I ignored jus ad bellum considerations because those participating in hostilities, regardless of the justness of their cause, can never be innocent or harmless in the truest sense of the word.
However, Geneva IV does not appear to prohibit the killing of civilian leaders involved in prosecuting the war. One comes to this conclusion because Geneva IV protects, from wartime attack, only those individuals -taking no active part in the hostilities." 28 While there is no brightline test on the amount of active participation in hostilities required to make civilian leaders eligible for wartime attack, 29 a fair argument could be made that any active participation in hostilities by the civilian leaders is sufficient to turn the leaders into quasi-combatants eligible for wartime attack. While the destruction of these objects may deprive the enemy state of its ability to wage war, such destruction often threatens the survival of the enemy's civilian population. It is this latter point that causes the greatest legal and moral concerns when targeting system essentials.
A Potential Domestic Legal Source of Protection
The legality of targeting an enemy's system essentials hinges on the degree to which: (1) the object contributes to the enemy's military action; (2) the object's destruction, capture, or neutralization offers us a definite military advantage, and; (3) if the object is the enemy's food supply, the degree to which the food supply is indispensable to the survival of the enemy, civilian population. Protocol I reminds us that we may lawfully attack only those objects -which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose ... The net effect of these provisions is that they establish a test that helps one determine the legality of targeting not only system essentials but the legality of targeting third-ring objectivescritical, infrastructures-as well. As a result of Protocol I, we may legally target only those system essentials that effectively contribute to the enemy's military action, whose targeting confers a definite military advantage and, with respect to system essentials that are food stuffs, targeting that is not expected to lead to the starvation of the enemy civilian population or force its movement. Targeting that fails to comply with the first two prongs, or in the case of foodstuffs all three prongs, will be violative of Protocol I and thus unlawful.
Finally, to the extent that such targeting adversely affects those not engaged in the prosecution of war, i.e., those previously defined as innocent, such targeting could arguably be immoral.
Notes
40 Warden, p. 315, Table 1 . 41 Protocol I, Part IV, Section I, Chapter 3, Article 52(2), Laws of War, p. 417. 42 However, even an indirect attack on an enemy's civilian population may run afoul of international law and moral norms. Of particular concern is the targeting of those civilian populations and civilians who take no direct part in hostilities. Protocol I specifically prohibits making such civilian populations and civilians the object of attack. 48 Moreover, it prohibits -all acts or threats of violence primarily designed to terrorize civilian populations." 49 Thus the legality of indirect attacks on enemy, civilian populations, however fashioned, will depend on the primary purpose of the attacks. If the indirect attacks are acts or threats of violence primarily designed to make objects of attack out of or terrorize civilian populations and civilians not involved in hostilities, the international community will most likely view the attacks as illegal.
Conversely, if the indirect attacks are not primarily designed to make objects of attack out of or terrorize the innocent, the attacks will likely pass muster under international law.
Finally, the morality of indirectly attacking the enemy's civilian population hinges on the degree to which the civilian population is involved in hostilities. 53 Put simply, Protocol I prohibits attacks on hors de combat; this would appear to be the only legal impediment to attacking the enemy's fielded force.
Determining the morality of attacking hors de combat is much more difficult. Such individuals are not innocent in the truest sense of the word; they will likely have engaged in hostilities. However, to the extent that they lack the ability to engage in future hostilities and have disavowed any notion of engaging in hostilities, they can arguably be viewed as innocent so as to make their attack morally reprehensible.
Part 8

Conclusion
In the final analysis, Warden's five-ring system theory is an excellent tool for identifying With respect to the legality of indirect attacks on the enemy's civilian population, the legality hinges on whether the targeting is designed primarily to terrorize those portions of the enemy's civilian population or civilians not directly involved in hostilities. If the targeting is primarily designed to terrorize the innocent, it would be violative of Protocol I and thus illegal.
If the targeting is not primarily designed for such purposes, it would arguably be legal. 
